California’s sidewalk vending statutes reflect a legislative tradeoff: local governments may regulate through objective health and safety rules, but enforcement is meant to stay within a deliberately narrow set of tools. Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego underscores what that bargain looks like in litigation. The decision is less about sidewalk vending in isolation and more about a familiar public-law constraint: when the Legislature specifies a capped penalty scheme, cities do not get to increase consequences by relabeling punishment as “administration.”
Seen that way, impoundment isn’t a neutral housekeeping device—it functions like an added sanction. And if the state statute doesn’t authorize it, calling it something else doesn’t solve the problem. The opinion also matters for process: on appeal from a preliminary injunction, courts won’t let trial courts blur distinct statutory-conflict issues as if everything were just discretionary balancing. That is why the court sent the case back.
What happened
Imhotep Mustaqeem, a licensed sidewalk vendor, had sold packaged snacks outside Petco Park since 2009. After San Diego adopted and later tightened its sidewalk vending regulations, he received citations in June and July 2024. Twice in July, the City impounded his product; on one occasion it also seized an envelope of cash from sales. Mustaqeem sued and sought a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of several provisions while the case proceeded. The trial court denied relief, finding only a “minimal probability” of success on the merits and concluding the equities favored the City.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. Several questions presented were pure statutory interpretation—reviewed de novo—and the trial court’s all-in-one treatment of four distinct legal challenges did not squarely address two facial conflicts between the City’s code and state law.
The legal backdrop: SB 946’s “fines-first” structure
The state’s 2018 legislation (Gov. Code §§ 51036–51039) limits how cities can regulate sidewalk vendors. It allows local, objective health/safety/welfare rules—but it also caps penalties and specifies what enforcement can look like. For many violations, it provides an escalating administrative fine structure, with permit rescission only after repeated violations; and it prohibits piling on “additional fines, fees, assessments, or any other financial conditions” beyond what the statute authorizes.
Against that backdrop, the record at the preliminary-injunction stage put two provisions front and center—both of which the Court of Appeal viewed as facially inconsistent with the state scheme: the City’s impoundment mechanism and its event-based hours restriction in the Ballpark District.
Two provisions the court flagged as facially unlawful
1) Impoundment (San Diego Mun. Code § 36.0111)
The Court of Appeal concluded the City’s impoundment scheme facially conflicted with Government Code section 51039. In plain terms: state law lays out a fines-first structure (and eventual permit rescission), and it does not authorize impoundment as a general penalty for sidewalk-vending violations. The court highlighted provisions allowing impoundment after a first violation, impoundment for vending without a permit (where state law instead provides a specific fine structure with possible reduction upon proof of a valid permit), and impoundment after three citations (where the state statute contemplates rescission after the fourth or later).
The City attempted to justify impoundment by pointing to statutory language about food-safety laws and to provisions that apply to vending in city parks. The court wasn’t persuaded on this record, noting Mustaqeem sold pre-packaged goods and that the Ballpark District is not a city park.
2) Ballpark District hours restriction (San Diego Mun. Code § 36.0106(a)(6))
San Diego’s code barred vending in the Ballpark District during events and for a buffer window (three hours before through one hour after). The Court of Appeal focused on a specific state-law constraint: in nonresidential areas, limits on sidewalk vending hours “shall not be more restrictive” than limits imposed on other businesses or uses on the same street. The trial court’s view—that health and safety concerns could effectively override that “same street” comparator—didn’t match the statutory text.
Notably, the Court of Appeal did not hold the City can never impose event-related restrictions. It held the statute imposes two gates: (1) an objective health/safety/welfare connection and (2) the “not more restrictive than other businesses on the same street” limitation for hours-based restrictions in nonresidential areas.
What the court did not decide (and what it did uphold)
Mustaqeem also argued the City’s broader location restrictions created a de facto ban on vending in viable commercial areas. The Court of Appeal found the record and argument on that broader “systemwide ban” theory insufficient at the preliminary injunction stage (while acknowledging some specific geographic prohibitions might raise problems in the future, depending on evidence).
And importantly for public-entity risk management: the court rejected Mustaqeem’s challenge to the City’s permit condition requiring vendors to release and indemnify the City. The court reasoned the key state provisions Mustaqeem relied on address where and when vendors operate, not whether the City can require liability protections as a condition of permitting.
Why this matters for businesses, venues, and cities
Even though this case arises from sidewalk vending, the lesson is broader: when the Legislature creates a detailed regulatory scheme with capped penalties, local actors have less room to improvise enforcement tools—especially tools that operate like extra punishment.
Practical takeaways
• For cities and regulators: map every enforcement mechanism to the state statute’s express authorizations. If state law says “fine schedule + permit rescission,” adding impoundment (or comparable economic leverage) is vulnerable as a facial conflict.
• For challengers: don’t lead with an “everything is invalid” theory. This opinion rewards litigants who isolate clean, text-based conflicts that are reviewable as questions of law—especially at the preliminary injunction stage.
• For venue operators and adjacent businesses: event-day “security” or “congestion” rationales may support targeted rules, but the statute may still require apples-to-apples comparisons (i.e., how the street treats other businesses’ hours). Build compliance and stakeholder strategies with that comparator in mind.
Bottom line
The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and sent the case back so the trial court can reassess the injunction request under the correct statutory framework—particularly on impoundment and the Ballpark District hours restriction—while leaving broader “ban” theories and factual balancing for further development.